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A judge? You don't want to make a judge a doctor of laws! Politicians are the 
ones who make the laws, and pass the laws! 
Jim Hacker MP in ‘Yes Minister’ (1981) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
This paper deals with a practice that we have called ‘striking back’, a phenomenon all too 
often glossed over in the literature of judicial review. By ‘striking back’ we mean official 
responses to court rulings that are deliberately negative in the sense that government or 
administration sets out to rid itself of a judicial decision that it finds inconvenient or 
otherwise dislikes. Striking back is essentially a backward-looking or ‘fire-fighting’ activity 
designed to remove or minimise the effects of a specific decision. In its impact it may 
nonetheless be purely forward-looking, eg, regulations may be redrafted or a new statutory 
definition substituted with prospective effect. Occasionally, however, the action taken is 
retrospective - a dubious practice that we shall nonetheless encounter on several occasions in 
this paper. Also, government may adopt a ‘fire-watching’ stance, taking steps to protect itself 
against the threat of future judicial ‘interference’ by changing the rules of the game in 
restrictive fashion, a variant on striking back that we call ‘clamping down’. There are many 
forms of pre-emptive action, ranging from structural or procedural changes to the judicial 
review process with a view to blunting substantive legal action, to changes made to the 
general funding regime with a view to inhibiting it. At this pragmatic level, striking back is to 
be read as an element in a broader literature of impact theory, though this is typically more 
concerned with evaluating the positive effects of judicial review on bureaucratic decision-
making and its impact on officialdom.1 
 
At a higher, constitutional level, striking back forms an intrinsic part of the ‘law and 
democracy’ debate, challenging the complacent assumption that courts ‘control’ government 
or ‘secure’ the rights of citizens.2 Courts in the UK constitution are classically seen as 
exercising the twin functions of protecting individuals and controlling misuse of power by the 
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executive. The ability to secure compliance with judicial rulings is therefore inevitably a 
measure of ‘how effective judicial review is at protecting individual rights and reducing 
government lawlessness’.3 For a period of almost forty years, the Application for Judicial 
Review (AJR) – the procedural machinery of judicial review - has been refined and there has 
been steady expansion of its ambit. At every stage of the process it is infused with 
considerable judicial discretion.4 Predicated at one level on vibrant common law principles, at 
another on many applications of EU law and Convention rights, judicial review has been 
transformed.5 A court-centred literature has mushroomed. By looking at judicial review other 
than through judicial eyes this paper is a modest attempt to redress the balance.   
 
Striking back is hardly new, nor is it confined to the Westminster model of parliamentary 
government (though this obviously offers great potential). We need only look back to Paris in 
the 1960s to find that the highly prestigious French Conseil d'Etat – at that time considered 
the acme of administrative jurisdictions – was experiencing considerable difficulty in 
implementing its rulings and had installed a special section, the Commission du Rapport, 
dedicated to tackling the problem. Guy Braibant, then commissaire du gouvernenement, 
highlighted three main tactics whereby recalcitrant public authorities could avoid 
implementing bothersome judgments: (i) they could utilise delaying tactics, involving 
appeals, judicial delays and the jurisdictional complexities of the dual French jurisdictions; 
(ii) they could retake annulled decisions by proper procedures; or (iii) they could resort to 
validatory legislation.6 Harlow, in a follow-up article,7 added the possibility (iv) that 
‘government would simply disobey’. Citing as exceptional the case of Madzimbamuto v 
Lardner-Burke8 - where the Privy Council had to proceed to judgment in the face of a clear 
statement that the Rhodesian regime would not respect it - the author felt justified in 
remarking that it was ‘assumed in England that administrative law judgments will be 
implemented’.9 There is indeed a general perception that domestic judges operate within a 
mandatory model of judicial review in which powerful mandatory public law orders, 
injunctions and interdicts can be directed at all public authorities.10 
 
Our interest in striking back arose in an era when UK ministers could count on the powerful 
weapon of parliamentary sovereignty. Part I of this paper, which looks more closely at the 
tools and techniques at the disposal of central government to achieve its ends,11 is ‘domestic’ 
in the sense that it focuses on examples in which this historic constitutional model is directly 
in play. But ratification of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) in 1951 and 
concession of the right of individual petition to the Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) in 1966, 
                                                 
3 Ibid at 30. 
4 C Harlow and R Rawlings, Law and Administration , 3rd edn (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009) 
(hereafter Law and Administration 3), ch. 15. 
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6 G Braibant, ‘Remarques sur l’efficacité des annulations pour excès de pouvoir’ [1961] EDCE 53. 
7 C Harlow, ‘Administrative Reaction to Judicial Review’ [1976] PL116. 
8 [1969] 1 AC 645. 
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10 See M v Home Office [1994] AC 377 (Lord Woolf).  
11 The positions of the devolved governments lie beyond the scope of the paper.   
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accession to the then European Communities in 1973 and passage of the Human Rights Act 
1998, set in motion changes to the constitutional framework with consequential displacement 
in the balance of power between legislature, executive and judiciary.12 More prosaically, each 
in its own way changed the rules of the litigation game in expansive fashion. Thus Part II of 
the paper considers the limitations on striking back after the introduction into the legal order 
of the two powerful European courts sitting in Luxembourg and Strasbourg. Under these 
regimes, striking back has in some ways become harder and the steps taken to counter 
judicial decisions may have to be different: in terms of Braibant’s classification, there is less 
scope for validatory legislation but more room for delaying tactics. Nonetheless, a recurring 
theme of the paper is continuity; the objectives of striking back and often the tactics – though 
not always the targets - remain, we shall suggest, broadly the same.  
 
Our research for  Pressure Through Law (1992),13 where we set out to evaluate the ‘success’ 
of litigation strategies by interest groups, taught us that pre-emptive action is not always a 
question of government versus judiciary. The aim may be to stack the cards against (classes 
of) individual litigants and/or to target strategic forms of litigation or even particular 
campaigning groups. We ventured to prophesy that the UK government might one day take 
major steps to clamp down on judicial review. We identified various possibilities. 
Government might (v) take direct and drastic steps: for example, by inserting an ouster clause 
into a statute governing a substantial area of government activity. It might restrict the 
competence of the courts or render justice less effective: for example, by moving all 
immigration cases out of courts into immigration tribunals without giving them power to 
order injunctive relief. Appeal rights might be curtailed or very short time limits for legal 
action imposed. Less directly, government might (vi) take action to undercut the judicial 
review process itself. One option was stricter rules of standing – something of a temptation at 
a time when the statutory test of ‘sufficient interest’ had been opened up in a way that would 
greatly facilitate public interest litigation.14 Funding was an obvious target; (vii) the cost of 
judicial review could be made prohibitive by changing the right to legal aid or ramping up 
court fees. These tactics are the subject of extended discussion in Part I of the paper where 
two such general forays by UK governments are documented: the first when in 2003-4 
Labour Home Secretary David Blunkett led retaliatory action against the judges in 
immigration and asylum cases; the second when under the 2010-2015 Coalition Government 
of Conservatives and Liberal Democrats a raft of restrictions on the judicial review process 
was launched.  
 
We pick up a second theme from Pressure Through Law in Part II of the paper. In 1992, we 
documented the start at domestic level of the use of arguments based on European law and of 
the growth of public interest litigation at Strasbourg and Luxembourg. Here we note the rise 
of a movement for thoroughgoing retaliatory action against these two courts in response to 
events described briefly in Part II of the paper. At the time of writing, threats are being made 
of recourse to (viii) the ‘nuclear option’ of legislating against international legal obligations. 
                                                 
12 V Bogdanor, The New British Constitution (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2009).  
13 C Harlow and R Rawlings, Pressure Through Law (London: Routledge, 1992) (hereafter PtL) ch. 7. 
14 IRC v National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Businesses [1982] AC 617.  
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As we shall see, the suggestion has openly been made in the House of Commons of 
introducing a Canadian-style ‘notwithstanding clause’ into legislation,15 while the Manifesto 
on which the Conservatives won the 2015 election, promised to ‘scrap Labour’s Human 
Rights Act and introduce a British Bill of Rights. 16 
 
 
 
 
Part I: Westminster at Home 
 
Flying high 
 
In the uncodified UK constitution, where Parliament is legally sovereign, compliance with 
judicial rulings must ultimately be a matter of expectation - but an expectation strongly 
underpinned by appeal to the rule of law.17 Although it may theoretically always be open to 
government to legislate, even retrospectively, to reverse a judicial decision, ministers may be 
subject to criticism and pressed to play fair. If a government departs too far from the 
expectation, judicial retaliation and a breakdown of the usually harmonious relations between 
executive and judiciary may be provoked. A game of legislative and adjudicative ‘ping pong’ 
between judges and ministers may ensue.  
 
The sequels to particular cases illustrate the different ways in which government may choose 
to strike back. The first edition of our textbook, Law and Administration in 1984,18  included 
a trio of examples from the domestic pantheon of great cases. In Burmah Oil,19 a paradigm 
case of striking back, the government used legislation both retrospectively to annul a House 
of Lords decision so as to deprive Burmah Oil of any damages that might be awarded and 
prospectively to clamp down on future claims. Professor HWR Wade excoriated the ‘unusual 
measure of retaliation’ as a demonstration that Parliament ‘can, when it wishes, expropriate 
without compensation and in violation of existing legal right, in a manner not permitted in 
some other countries which enjoy the protection of written constitutions and bills of rights’.20 
Our case study presented both sides of the argument, remaining studiously neutral. On the 
one hand, retrospective legislation was dangerous because it overstepped the essential 
boundary between executive and judiciary; on the other hand, it was justifiable in this case to 
restore parity between the many victims of war damage who had accepted limited 
                                                 
15 A ‘notwithstanding clause’ takes its name from s 33 of the Canadian Charter of Rights, under which 
legislation may provide that it shall operate notwithstanding the provisions of the Charter. 
16 See Conservative Party Manifesto 2015 and Protecting Human Rights in the United Kingdom, The 
Conservatives’ Proposals for  Changing Britain’s Human Rights Laws (2014). 
17 Perhaps increasingly so: T Bingham, The Rule of Law (London: Allen Lane, 2010). 
18 C Harlow and R Rawlings, Law and Administration  (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1984)  (Law and 
Administration 1). 
19 Burmah Oil v Lord Advocate [1965] AC 75 was annulled by the War Damage Act 1965. 
20 See latterly, HWR Wade and C Forsyth, Administrative Law, 11th edn, (Oxford: OUP, 2014) at 000.  
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compensation and the few able to claim redress through the courts on a (supposedly) 
preferential scale.21 
Our second illustration was Padfield,22 the archetypal example of striking back by taking the 
same decision twice (Braibant’s second category). The House of Lords having moved 
decisively to control ministerial discretionary power, the minister implemented the 
judgement by referring the impugned decision to an investigatory committee for 
consideration; he then declined to follow its advice. This outcome illustrates the ‘halfway-
house’ nature of quashing orders (formerly certiorari), which allow the administration to 
revisit a matter following correct procedures. Today, this is a well-established and usually 
lawful practice, as illustrated in R(Greenpeace) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry,23 
where a consultation exercise concerning government policy on 'nuclear new build' was 
quashed as 'very seriously flawed'. Having ‘reviewed the evidence’ and ‘carefully re-
examined the impact of excluding nuclear power from our future energy mix’, the 
government maintained its position and policy.  
 
Anisminic,24arguably the most significant of all twentieth-century judicial review cases in 
England, was our third example. It concerned that emblematic device of ‘striking back’ 
and/or ‘clamping down’, a preclusive clause. The statute plainly stated that a ‘determination’ 
of the Foreign Compensation Commission ‘shall not be called in question in any court of law’. 
The Commission duly made an error of law in making a decision; in the face of the ouster, 
the House of Lords duly ruled the decision a nullity. Lord Reid’s famous speech listing the 
many factors that might render a decision a nullity - bad faith, jurisdictional error, breach of 
natural justice, irrelevant considerations, etc. – was sufficient to render preclusive clauses 
virtually ineffective. Yet the immediate effects of Anisminic were quickly mitigated by new 
legislation, which introduced limited appeal rights but otherwise expanded the statutory 
formula such that a Commission determination including ‘anything which purports to be a 
determination’ was protected. We suggested that ‘control’ models of administrative law, in 
which courts controlled abuse of power and successfully defended citizens’ rights against 
erosion by the state, needed ‘some modification’.25  
Though obviously atypical when viewed in terms of the great bulk of routine or 
‘bureaucratic’ judicial review, striking back had thus been identified as a significant feature 
of the working constitution. Later high profile examples of government manoeuvring would 
confirm the element of continuity. Take the subterfuge by which Whitehall tried to by-pass 
the provisions of the Criminal Justice Act 1988, which unexpectedly and against the wishes 
of the government placed on a statutory basis the existing ex gratia criminal injuries 
compensation scheme. In Fire Brigades Union,26 a much cited authority on separation of 
                                                 
21 Law and Administration 1 at 377-382. 
22 Padfield v Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food [1968] AC 997; Law and Administration I at 327-329. 
23 [2007] EWHC 311 at [116-120] (Sullivan J). And see Meeting the Energy Challenge: A White Paper on Energy, 
Cm 7124 (2007); Meeting the Energy Challenge: A White Paper on Nuclear Power, Cm 7296 (2008). 
24 Anisminic v Foreign Compensation Commission [1969] 2 AC 147. 
25 Law and Administration 1 at 102-107, 282. 
26 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p. Fire Brigades Union [1995] 2 AC 513. 
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powers, the Law Lords narrowly upheld a challenge to the Home Secretary’s decision to 
substitute a new, less generous, tariff scheme on the ground of inconsistency with the 
continuing power to bring the statutory scheme into force. The victory was quickly reversed 
when the Criminal Compensation Act 1995 introduced the tariff system albeit with some 
concessions. Or take the executive machinations surrounding the shocking affair of the 
Chagos islanders, expelled from their homeland in the interests of establishing an American air 
base. When the High Court quashed the expulsion orders,27 the UK Government indicated that 
the islanders would be allowed to return. Instead, it invoked an antiquated prerogative power to 
legislate by Order in Council in colonial territories to reverse the decision and make 
unauthorised presence on the islands a criminal offence. Game, set and match went to the 
Government in the domestic courts when in Bancoult (No. 2)28 the House of Lords by a 3-2 
majority upheld this course of action.  
 
Ground level  
 
At the time of Pressure Through Law, studies of the impact of judicial review on British 
administration were rare and we had to depend on American studies, mainly authored by 
sociologists and political scientists and aimed at evaluating (as we ourselves were doing) the 
contribution of public interest litigation. The American literature taught us that striking back 
was not always a high-visibility activity involving ministers and legislation. We recorded the 
discouragement of a leading American welfare lawyer as he realised that ‘victory for one 
class of welfare client leads inevitably to losses for another, less privileged, section of the 
community’.29  
 
Law and Administration presented an analysis of Malloch v Aberdeen Corporation,30 a 
largely-forgotten affair where the individual’s rights were expunged by the validating 
statutory formula that the minister’s power to make regulations ‘shall be deemed always to 
have included power’ to prescribe the employment only of registered teachers. We observed 
that ‘recognised techniques exist for the circumvention of court orders’ and that judicial 
decisions often ‘entailed no genuine reconsideration of policy’, though we stressed the need to 
‘beware generalisation’.31 Tony Prosser’s impact study of the fate of welfare test-cases - the first 
of its kind in the UK32 - took matters a step further. His conclusion was stark: ‘successful test 
cases which threaten established policy, especially by increasing expenditure, will meet with 
quick nullification by legislative or administrative action’.33 Prosser noted three main 
categories of negative response: action through primary legislation, sometimes retrospective 
                                                 
27 R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No. 1) [2001] QB 1067. 
28 R (Bancoult) v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No. 2) [2008] UKHL 61. Following 
an unsuccessful application by the islanders to the ECtHR (Chagos Islanders v UK, App 35622/04, 11 December 
2012), the saga has reached the Permanent Court of Arbitration (Republic of Mauritius v UK). 
29 E Sparer, ‘Gordian Knots: The Situation of Health Care Advocacy for the Poor Today’ (1981) Clearinghouse 
Review (May), 1 at 1. 
30 Malloch v Aberdeen Corporation [1971] 1 WLR 1578; Education (Scotland) Act 1973. 
31 Law and Administration 1 at 274-282. 
32 T Prosser, Test Cases for the Poor (London: CPAG, 1983). 
33 Ibid at 74. 
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in character; action through regulations, which given the cursory nature of the parliamentary 
procedures lessened the opportunity for open debate; and informal administrative practices, 
including furtive and underhand activity or deliberate disobedience. A celebrated Child 
Poverty Action Group victory in ex p Simper34 was, for example, virtually expunged by 
means of a secret circular that refused to implement some elements of the decision and 
unlawfully modified others. The justification given was that it would be ‘administratively 
impracticable’ to implement the decision, which failed to explain why the government did not 
proceed to legislation, as ultimately it was forced to do.35 Prosser also noted a dubious new 
trend to use legislative technique to anticipate or interrupt the judicial decision-making 
process. The touchstone is Atkinson,36 a case about student rights to welfare benefits, where 
the government pushed through retrospective statutory provision ahead of the relevant appeal, 
arguing that, were the department to lose, it would result in a substantial burden on public 
funds, serious administrative disruption and widespread abuse. Noting these practices in 
Pressure through Law, the authors were forceful, claiming that departmental technique was 
improving all the time in ‘heartlessly depriving’ claimants of the fruits of litigation and 
‘cynically expunging’ court victories.37  
 
This early case law introduces a persistent phenomenon. Two decades after Simper, the 
House of Lords was faced  in Bate38 with complex statutory provision specifically designed to 
bar the re-opening of social security claims affected by subsequent contrary rulings - the so-
called ‘anti-test case’ clause.39 By the time the House of Lords overturned it, the Court of 
Appeal judgment circumventing the restriction had already been obliterated by the rapid use 
of delegated legislation. Providing against unfavourable judicial rulings had become a 
standard part of social security administration that we shall meet again in Part II. 
 
This is not to deny that government action to counter the effects of judicial rulings is often 
legitimate or even necessary. As well as being expensive and time-consuming, the litigation 
process is classically two-dimensional; issues of resources are not primarily the affair of 
judges.40 The test of legitimacy is not only what is done but how it is done. Prefiguring the 
voluminous contemporary debate over constitutional ‘dialogue’ between the legislature and 
executive and the judiciary,41 Prosser suggested three basic criteria: (i) the response must be 
made publicly; (ii) there should be opportunity for adequate informed debate; (iii) a properly 
reasoned justification must be presented by government. Tested against these standards, many 
routine administrative practices must surely fail. The vices inherent in secret administrative 
                                                 
34 R v Greater Birmingham Appeal Tribunal ex p Simper [1974] QB 543.  
35 Prosser at 61-2; National Insurance and Supplementary Benefit Act 1973.  
36 R v Barnsley SBAT ex p Atkinson [1976] 1 WLR 1047 (DC), [1977] 1 WLR 917 (CA); Supplementary 
Benefits (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1977; Prosser at 45-6, 63-5. 
37 PtL at 301. 
38Bate v Chief Adjudication Officer [1996] 1 WLR 814; Income Related Benefits Schemes (Miscellaneous 
Amendments) (No 6) Regulations 1994, SI 1994/3061. 
39 Latterly, s. 27 of the Social Security Act 1998. 
40 But see Law and Administration 3 at 717-722. 
41 For a recent overview, see M Cohn, ‘Sovereignty, Constitutional Dialogues, and Political Networks: A 
Comparative and Conceptual Study’ in R Rawlings, P Leyland and A Young (eds), Sovereignty and the Law 
(Oxford: OUP, 2013).  
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instructions are neatly underscored in Anufrijeva,42 where the Home Office sought to justify a 
policy of not notifying asylum seekers of withdrawal of income support under the regulations 
on grounds of expense and administrative inconvenience. By a majority, the House of Lords 
outlawed this way of proceeding as a violation of the fundamental right of access to justice 
and the rule of law. It was a ‘peep into contemporary standards of public administration’ of 
which transparency was not a hallmark.43   
 
Shifting sands 
 
By 2009 we were sufficiently confident to say that ‘transforming judicial review … has a 
dual effect: not only biting more deeply on the policy-making sinews of government, but also 
limiting its capacity for a muscular response’.44 Beyond the protective cloak of parliamentary 
sovereignty, regulation-making looked increasingly vulnerable to legal challenge. In the 
period immediately prior to the Human Rights Act, the judicial review context was changing. 
Well-known cases such as ex p Witham,45 where the ‘constitutional right’ of access to court 
was used to block increased court fees for poor persons other than through specific statutory 
provision, and Simms,46 where the judges’ interpretative power in protection of ‘the basic 
rights of the individual’47 was underlined as an aspect of the principle of legality, marked a 
growth in rights-based jurisprudence at common law. Today, these developments also appear 
as precursor to a new wave of constitutional case-law in the Supreme Court premised on the 
common law’s vibrant potential.48   
 
As the recent case of R(Public Law Project) v Secretary of State for Justice49 reminds us, 
different judicial review methodologies can produce a similar effect. An attempt to introduce 
a residence test for civil legal aid, a forerunner of the Coalition Government’s more general 
attack on judicial review, was held unlawful on the standard basis that regulations must be 
consistent with the policy and object of the empowering statute. The High Court read 
Parliament’s intention in the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 
(‘LASPO’) as being to allocate civil legal aid to those in greatest need.50 For good measure, 
the court held that, in light of the overarching constitutional principle that all are equally 
subject to the law and entitled to its protection, the residence test as formulated involved 
discrimination that could not be justified.51 Since Parliament was still in the process of 
approving the regulations, this avowedly public interest challenge constituted an effective 
                                                 
42 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Anufrijeva [2003] UKHL 36. 
43 Ibid at [24] (Lord Steyn). 
44 Law and Administration 3 at 730. 
45 R v Secretary of State for Social Security, ex p Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants [1997] 1 WLR 
275. 
46 R v Secretary of State for the Home Department, ex p Simms [2000] 2 AC 115. 
47 Ibid at 131 (Lord Hoffmann).  
48 Exemplified by Osborn v Parole Board [2014] AC 1115; Kennedy v Charity Commission [2014] 
UKSC 20; and R (Evans) v Attorney General [2015] UKSC 21. 
49 [2014] EWHC 2365 (Admin). The case, which is one of a slew of recent challenges to restrictions on legal 
aid, is currently under appeal. 
50 Ibid at [45]. 
51 Ibid at [84]. 
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pre-emptive strike. Business had to be hastily re-arranged to avoid the unhappy prospect of 
the House of Lords debating the merits of provisions already declared unlawful!  
 
With a view to minimising legal risk, an extra premium has been placed on the use of statute, 
leading directly to ‘fast-track legislation’, another significant feature of the working 
constitution that is currently proliferating as a means of minimising the extra work, disruption 
and delay for government associated with the standard primary legislative process. Indeed, a 
successful call by the House of Lords Constitution Committee for reasoned justification of 
reductions of the primary legislative process to a matter of days has arguably had the perverse 
effect of normalising the technique by the establishment of guidelines.52  
 
Read against a background of increasing judicial resistance, the evident propensity for 
striking back translates into elongated forms of ‘ping pong’. Take the case of welfare support 
for asylum seekers. Regulations designed to exclude many asylum seekers from benefit were 
ruled ultra vires on the basis that condemning people to ‘a life so destitute that no civilised 
nation could tolerate it’ needed clear statutory authorisation.53 But primary legislation in the 
guise of the Asylum and Immigration Act 1996 promptly reinstated the regulations from the 
date of the statute and removed the right to assistance in respect of homelessness. The Court 
of Appeal found a way round via the National Assistance Act 194854 but ministers struck 
back again with the Immigration and Asylum Act 1999, which excluded the operation of the 
1948 Act in similar cases. The later Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002 removed 
support for those making ‘late’ asylum claims save where it was necessary to avoid a breach 
of Convention rights. After further twists and turns, judicial guidance on a modicum of 
entitlement was eventually forthcoming in Limbuela.55 ‘Far from the happy idea of 
“partnership”’, we noted ‘sharp conflict between the executive and the judiciary in the 
context of draconian legislation directed at a vulnerable group’.56 
 
As Lord Steyn was once at pains to emphasise, never say never in judicial review. Posed as 
the proverbial ‘nuclear deterrent’, and so redolent of a period of heightened constitutional 
tensions, the remarkable obiter dicta in the Jackson case57 are today just about visible on the 
Westminster radar screen. According to Lord Steyn, ministers should understand that if 
Parliament were to introduce 'oppressive and wholly undemocratic legislation' - as for 
example by moving to abolish judicial review - then the judges, who (according to Lord 
Steyn) had created the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, might have to qualify it. In 
other words, faced with an attempt to clamp down by statute, they might have to consider 
                                                 
52 Constitution Committee, Fast-track Legislation: Constitutional Implications and Safeguards (15th Report,  
2008–09, HL 116).  
53 R v. Secretary of State for Social Security ex p Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants I [1996] 4 All ER 
385 (Simon Brown LJ). 
54 R v Westminster City Council ex p M (1997) 1 CCLR 85. 
55 R(Limbuela) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2005] UKHL 66. 
56Law and Administration 3 at 738- 747. 
57 Jackson v Attorney General [2005] UKHL 56. For similar dicta, seeSee also AXA General Insurance v Lord 
Advocate [2011] UKSC 46 (Lord Hope), and  Moohan v Lord Advocate [2014] UKSC 67 [35] (Lord Hodge) .  
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whether judicial review ‘is a constitutional fundamental which even a sovereign Parliament 
acting at the behest of a complaisant House of Commons cannot abolish’.58 
 
The First Foray 
 
Judicial review is too important to be the exclusive concern of the judges. In particular, we 
disagree with the view, expressed by an ex Law Lord,59 that judicial review is not a matter for 
Parliament. After all, in the long view, Parliament has not only flanked the inherent common 
law jurisdiction with major roles for the national courts in respect of the ECHR and EU, but 
also helped free the courts from their own historical legacy of arcane and restrictive 
procedural rules by grounding in section 31 of the Senior Courts Act 1981 the more generous 
and holistic modalities of AJR procedure. Given the twin-hatted position of the executive as 
chief defendant and chief legislative architect, however, a healthy scepticism is in order when 
considering government proposals to clamp down on judicial review.  
 
The conflict over benefits culminating in Limbuela was part of a wider political and legal 
struggle over decision-making in immigration and asylum taking place under the Labour 
Government and later extending, as we shall see, under the subsequent Coalition. Glossing 
over glaring defects in the quality of departmental administration, Prime Minister Tony Blair 
spoke of cutting back a ‘ludicrously complicated appeal process’ and of removing failed 
applicants ‘without further judicial interference’. Giving vent to populist ideas of majoritarian 
democracy, the Home Secretary, David Blunkett, bluntly declared that it was ‘time for judges 
to learn their place’. Through the Bill which eventually became the Asylum and Immigration 
(Treatment of Claimants, etc) Act 2004, the Government looked to the three techniques of 
squeezing legal services, reducing appeal rights, and ousting Dicey’s prized ‘ordinary courts’. 
For Rawlings, this was nothing less than ‘a revenge package’ designed ‘to pre-empt or 
drastically reduce a whole activity of formal legal challenge’ and thus ‘neuter the judicial role 
in the constitution’. 60   
 
The proposed ouster clause was designed to turn Lord Reid’s speech in Anisminic61 on its 
head, so knocking out his listed grounds of review one by one. Referencing the aftermath of 
that iconic case, this was the language of ‘prevent[ing] a court, in particular, from 
entertaining proceedings to determine whether a purported determination … was a nullity’ by 
reason of lack of jurisdiction, etc. The clause aimed to immunise both the administrative 
tribunal (responsible for adjudicating status determination decisions) and Home Office 
enforcement measures.62 Claims under the Human Rights Act were likewise attacked; linkage 
to the ordinary courts would essentially be confined to requests from the tribunal president 
for non-binding opinions on points of law. Using the informal and time-honoured ‘usual 
                                                 
58 Ibid at [102].   
59 Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood , HL Deb, vol 755 col 1440 (28 July 2014). 
60 R. Rawlings, ‘Review, Revenge and Retreat’ (2005) 68 MLR 378, 379. 
61 Above, n. 24. 
62 Contemporary developments in Australia provided a source of inspiration: see M Aronson, B Dyer and M 
Groves, Judicial Review of Administrative Action 3rd edn (Pyrmont: Lawbook, 2004), ch 17. 
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channels’, senior judges had naturally tried to stop the clause at an early stage; perversely, 
however, their technical analysis was used to tighten the drafting.63  
 
Armed with a huge majority, the Government had reason to be confident of definitively 
changing the rules of the game. Yet paradoxically the resulting imbroglio highlights the key 
role of Parliament – or more precisely, the House of Lords – in reinforcing expectations over 
judicial review. Despite much rhetoric along the lines of ‘unnecessary, vexatious and useless 
judicial reviews’, a failure publicly to document the scale and incidence of ‘abuse’ put 
ministers on the back foot in an increasingly forensic examination.64 The policy became 
messy as ministers were pressurised into making concessions or ‘clarifications’, for example 
over the continued availability of that common law hallmark, habeas corpus. Ministers could 
not wish away the prospect of successful challenge in Strasbourg65 or Luxembourg66 even 
though there would be an administrative tribunal in operation. However the Government’s 
eventual withdrawal of the ouster clause most clearly points up how domestic - common law 
- developments can not only produce a whiplash effect but also strengthen the judicial lines 
of defence in the political and legal processes. Confronted by the threat of such a radical 
departure from constitutional expectation, a line of senior legal figures summoned up, first, 
model precepts of government under law, equal protection, and access to the established legal 
system; and, second, the spectre of head-on constitutional conflict. In Lord Woolf’s terms, 
prefiguring Jackson, the courts might be ‘required to act in a manner which would be without 
precedent’ if Parliament ‘did the unthinkable’.67   
 
Though it was ministers who blinked first, they were not completely routed. The 2004 Act 
contained some additional restrictions on funding, made structural reforms to the tribunal 
system, and grounded a streamlined form of statutory review. Not, it must be said, that this 
did much to stem the tide of asylum and immigration litigation, which continued to dominate 
the caseload of the Administrative Court into the next decade.68 
 
The Second Foray 
 
In seeking to clamp down, the Coalition Government approached matters somewhat 
differently to their Labour counterparts. The policy involved a rebalancing of the internal 
dynamics of the judicial review process in favour of public authorities. It can also be read as 
attempting to turn the clock back towards a narrower conception of judicial review 
historically associated with a more restrained constitutional role for the courts and centred on 
individual redress of grievance and defence of private interest.69 Perhaps some element of 
institutional memory was in play. As against the hammer blow suggested by Labour’s ouster 
                                                 
63 Lord Woolf, ‘The Rule of Law and a Change in the Constitution’ (Cambridge University: Squire Centenary 
Lecture, 2004) at 8. See also, A Le Sueur, ‘Three strikes and it’s out?’ (2004) PL 225. 
64 For an informed view, see R Thomas, ‘The Impact of Judicial Review on Asylum’ (2003) PL 479.   
65 Notwithstanding a restrictive jurisprudence in asylum: Maaouia v France [2000] 33 EHRR 42.  
66 Especially in view of cases like Johnston on access to judicial process (see below). 
67 Lord Woolf, 'Droit Public - English Style' [1995] PL 57 at 69. 
68 For the later history, see R Thomas, ‘Immigration judicial reviews’ UK Const L Blog (12 September 2013). 
69 Associated with what we call the ‘drainpipe model’ of judicial review: PtL at 310-314.  
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clause, a whole series of screws would be tightened – harder to mobilise against.70 Unlike Mr 
Blunkett, Chris Grayling, the Secretary of State for Justice and Lord Chancellor, avoided 
ruffling feathers by direct criticism of the domestic judiciary. The official documentation 
suitably rehearsed the theme of judicial review as ‘the rule of law in action’.71  
 
The Coalition Government gave numerous reasons for clamping down. Some are classic 
concerns about the scale and nature of the caseload, as in the opening salvo that judicial 
review has ‘expanded massively’ and is ‘open to abuse’.72 Others speak to broader impacts 
on government and people; for which read negative effects of expensive and time-consuming 
litigation on schemes for economic growth and on the taxpayers’ purse in a period of 
austerity. Others again provide glimpses of constitutional theory, to the effect of buttressing 
the ‘separate identity’ of the judicial process from the normal rough-and-tumble of the 
political process. The evident concern that, in the words of the House of Lords Constitution 
Committee, ‘judicial review has become too much of a political tool of opposition to 
government policy’,73 also shows a revengeful element: witness Mr Grayling’s declared 
interest in restricting ‘a promotional tool for countless Left-wing campaigners’.74  
 
As under Labour, the scale of the rhetoric is in inverse proportion to the strength of the 
evidence base. In blunting government claims of sharp growth75 and few tangible results, 
critics had a field day in the statistics,76 underlining the important role of settlement, limited 
growth outside asylum and immigration, and of course infinitesimal numbers of cases when 
compared with the scale of government decision-making. Likewise, when considering the 
caseload pressures on the Administrative Court, a recent transfer of most immigration 
reviews to the Upper Tribunal by the Lord Chief Justice77 can scarcely be ignored.   
 
The policy was rolled out in successive rounds of law-making. Published in December 2012, 
the consultation paper Judicial Review: proposals for reform zeroed in on procedural changes 
that could be quickly introduced.  Given that only a small minority of cases proceed beyond 
the distinctive permission (‘leave’) stage of AJR procedure to full hearing,78 this was the 
natural target. The Government proposed a package consisting of shorter time limits for 
bringing claims, most notably in planning cases, a new court fee and restriction of the right to 
renew a claim dismissed on the papers, duly implemented via changes to the Civil Procedure 
                                                 
70 For the attempted spoiler, see M Fordham et al, Streamlining Judicial Review in a Manner Consistent with the 
Rule of Law (London: Bingham Centre,.2014).   
71 Ministry of Justice, Judicial Review: proposals for reform Cm 8515, 2012 at [11]. 
72 Cm 8703, foreword. 
73 Constitution Committee, Criminal Justice and Courts Bill , HL 18 (2014-15) at [6]. 
74 Reported in The Daily Mail, 6 September 2013.  
75 From 4500+ applications for permission in 1998 to 12,400 in 2012: Cm 8703 at [9]. 
76 V Bondy and M Sunkin, ‘Who is afraid of judicial review? Debunking the myths of growth and abuse’ UK 
Const L Blog (10 January 2013).  
77 Practice Direction given in accordance with Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 and s 
18 of the Tribunals, Courts and Enforcement Act 2007 (21 August 2013). 
78 In 2011, there were 11,360 applications for, and 1276 grants of, permission to proceed: Ministry of Justice, 
Judicial Review: proposals for further reform Cm 8703, 2013 at 9. 
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Rules operative from July 2013.79 In an important flanking development, regulations were 
used to make the payment of legal aid fees conditional on success at the permission stage, 
with only limited exception for ‘meritorious cases’ settled by public authorities.80  
 
Published in September 2013, a second consultation paper, Judicial Review: proposals for 
further reform, outlined a series of possible statutory reforms. One major piece in the jigsaw 
was however quickly lost in the pre-legislative process. The idea of rationing judicial review 
and hitting at strategic forms of litigation by rewinding the test of standing towards ‘direct 
interest’81 was effectively vetoed by the senior judiciary. Having at first stood on the key 
principle from representative democracy that ‘Parliament and the elected Government are 
best placed to determine what is in the public interest’,82 ministers seemingly had no answer 
to the liberal judicial orthodoxy that ‘unlawful use of executive power should not persist 
because of the absence of an available challenger with a sufficient interest’.83 By 
corroborating this key constitutional expectation grounded in the rule of law, their own 
evidence of relatively high rates of success for public interest litigants84 hardly helped the 
Government. 
 
Other restrictive proposals eventually made it to the statute book in Part 4 of the Criminal 
Justice and Courts Act 2015. Relevant sections deal with such matters as permission (leave) 
and third party intervention, costs orders85 and information about financial backing86 (an 
historical echo surely of the extinct common law torts of maintenance and champerty87). Two 
overlapping features command attention. First, there is repeated use of financial disincentives 
to litigate, a redeployment of risk. A chief target is public interest litigation as commonly 
practised by expert ‘repeat players’; and, more particularly, procedural techniques like 
protective costs orders88 which have been developed in recent years to facilitate the activity. 
Secondly, judicial discretion, which we identified earlier as a key ingredient in the domestic 
process of ‘transforming judicial review’, is targeted. In seeking to codify existing judicial 
powers to craft and discipline the shape of judicial review proceedings, Mr Grayling has 
preferred ‘must’ to the ‘may’ word. Not that ministers had it all their own way in the formal 
legislative process; some limited concessions were extracted by the House of Lords via the 
                                                 
79 Civil Procedure (Amendment No 4) Rules 2013, SI No 2013/1412. 
80 Civil Legal Aid (Remuneration) (Amendment) (No. 3) Regulations 2014, SI No 2014/607. The subject of ‘a 
regret motion’: see HL Deb vol 753 cols 1540-1568 (7 May 2014). 
81 Closer that is to the ‘victim test’ for Convention rights claims: Human Rights Act 1998, s. 7.  
82 Cm 8703 at [80].  
83 Senior Judiciary, Response to the consultation entitled ‘Judicial Review: Proposals for Further Reform’ 
(2014) at [15].  
84 Cm 8703 at [78].  
85 Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, ss 88-90. There is however special provision for environmental cases 
in light of the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and 
Access to Justice in Environmental Matters. 
86 Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, ss 85-86.  
87 PtL at 48-50. 
88 R(Corner House Research) v Secretary of State for Trade and Industry [2005] 1 WLR 2600. 
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process of parliamentary ‘ping pong’ with (the executive seat of power in) the Commons.89 
Neatly demonstrating the sense of continuity, senior legal figures headed by Lord Woolf once 
again took a leading role against the Government, trumpeting the rule of law in ministers’ 
ears.  
Two provisions serve for illustration. The first90 hits directly at public interest intervention, 
which became established as a means of bolstering judicial decision-making in the 1990s91 
and has seen a step change in usage in the wake of the HRA.92 It imposes a duty on the High 
Court and Court of Appeal to levy the consequential costs on those choosing to intervene if 
any one of four conditions is met: the intervener acts ‘in substance’ as a principal party; their 
intervention is not of ‘significant assistance’; a ‘significant part’ of it is ‘not necessary’ for 
resolution of the issues; ‘the intervener has behaved unreasonably’. Since intervention has 
been pre-eminently a matter of permission on terms, lack of trust in the judges is the not-so-
subliminal message.  
Bearing directly on the exercise of the supervisory jurisdiction, the second provision93 takes 
the process of instructing the judges to another level. It expands on the so-called ‘no 
difference’ doctrine, whereby the court exercises discretion to refuse permission or a final 
remedy because the public authority would surely have made the same decision if it had acted 
lawfully.94 The Act substitutes the (somewhat arcane) test of ‘highly likely that the outcome 
for the applicant would not have been substantially different’ and is drafted in mandatory 
terms: if the court considers the test made out, it ‘must refuse’ to grant permission or relief 
Viewed through ministerial spectacles, the formula has the considerable attraction of 
reducing the scope for administrative disruption, not least in view of the recently burgeoning 
common law jurisprudence on consultation requirements.95 The approach is rightly criticised 
however as being a get out card for unlawful conduct and a likely driver of argument at the 
permission – supposedly filter – stage.96 Only thanks to the House of Lords is there now a 
special judicial trump whereby the restriction may be disregarded if the court considers and 
certifies that ‘it is appropriate to do so for reasons of exceptional public interest’. We recall 
the firm words of The Judge Over Your Shoulder, the guidance for civil servants issued by 
the Treasury Solicitor’s Department: ‘the principle is that only a fair procedure will enable 
the merits to be determined with confidence’.97 Time will tell how the serving judiciary 
responds. 
                                                 
89 For the twists and turns, see HC Deb, vol 589 cols 70-100 (1 December 2014); HL Deb, vol 757 cols 1737-
1785 (9 December 2014); HC Deb, vol 590 cols 808-833 (13 January 2015); HL Deb, vol 759 cols 1341-1351 
(21 January 2015).  
90 Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, s. 87. 
91 See R Rawlings, ‘Courts and Interests’ in I Loveland (ed), A Special Relationship? American Influences on 
Public Law in the UK (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1995).   
92 S Shah, T Poole and M Blackwell, ‘Rights, Interveners and the Law Lords’ (2014) 34 OJLS 295. 
93 Criminal Justice and Courts Act 2015, s. 84. 
94 R(Core Issues Trust) v Transport for London [2014] EWCA Civ 34 at [42-44] (Lord Dyson MR). See further, 
R(Champion) v North Norfolk District Council [2015] UKSC 52. 
95 R(Plantagenet Alliance Ltd) v Secretary of State for Justice [2014] EWHC 1662.  
96 JCHR, The implications for access to justice of the Government’s proposals to reform judicial review (13th 
Report, 2013-14, HC 868) at [38-56]. 
97 Treasury Solicitor’s Department, The Judge Over Your Shoulder 4th edn (2006) at [2.46]. 
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Part II: Westminster in Europe 
 
Belated realisation  
 
Although this was not well understood at the time, the constitutional situation changed 
radically with passage of the European Communities Act 1972, which limited the freedom of 
the UK Parliament to legislate in a manner contrary to EC law. Westminster, which under 
Dicey’s classic theory of parliamentary sovereignty could make or unmake any law, was no 
longer in that comfortable position.98 A significant factor in the new dispensation was section 
3 of the 1972 Act, which rendered British courts effectively subservient to the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ, now CoJ) by providing that all questions as to the meaning or effect of EC law 
must be determined in accordance with its jurisprudence. As this jurisprudence developed, it 
transpired that national legislation must be interpreted so far as possible to comply with EC law 
or, if clearly non-compliant, must be ‘disapplied’.99 Moreover, the EC institutions gradually 
acquired sanctions. The Commission power to bring infringement proceedings was reinforced at 
Maastricht by the possibility of substantial fines,100 while the concept of member state liability 
in damages was introduced by the COJ in its controversial Francovich decision.101 The power 
in section 2(2) of the 1972 Act to implement an obligation under EC law by Order in Council 
and the thoroughgoing ‘Henry VIII clause’ in section 2(4) also contributed to an erosion of 
parliamentary power since they greatly reduced the opportunity for parliamentary debate. It took 
some time for the House of Commons102 - and latterly the Courts 103- to claw back the position 
by stages.  
 
It was not until the Factortame affair that Parliament and public became aware of the magnitude 
of constitutional change.104 The UK had sailed too close to the wind in the Merchant Shipping 
Act 1988 which, while purporting to implement Community fisheries policy, effectively limited 
ownership of fishing vessels to UK nationals for purposes of national fisheries quotas. When the 
Act was ruled incompatible with EC law,105 the UK faced actions in damages for losses caused 
to fishing companies106 said to be settled by payments in the region of £55 million. The high 
costs of non-compliance with EC law had become very apparent and the ‘shock of the new’ led 
the UK Government to attempt a strike-back. It took steps – though these were ultimately 
                                                 
98 See D Nicol, EC Membership and the Judicialization of British Politics (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2001) ch 6. 
99 See respectively Case C-106/89 Marleasing SA v La Comercial International de Alimentacion SA [1990] ECR 
I-4135; R v Secretary of State for Transport, ex p. Equal Opportunities Commission [1995] 1 AC 1. 
100 TEC Art 228, now TFEU Art 260; the UK has not in practice been subject to fines. 
101 Joined Cases 6, 9/90 Francovich and Bonafaci v Italy [1991] ECR I-5357. 
102 See notably s.6 of the European Assembly Elections Act 1978 and the European Union Act 2011.  
103 See Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin) and, for the position of the Supreme 
Court, R (on the application of HS2 Action Alliance Limited  [2014] UKSC 3. 
104 Nicol, ‘EC Membership’ ch 7. 
105 Case C 221/89 R v Secretary of State for Transport ex p Factortame [1991] ECR I-3905. 
106 Joined Cases C 46/93, C 48/93 Brasserie du Pêcheur SA v Germany, R v Secretary of State for Transport ex 
p Factortame [1996] ECR I-1029;  R v Secretary of State for Transport ex parte Factortame (No 5) [2000] 1 AC 
524. 
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unsuccessful - to gain support at the next Intergovernmental Conference for action to curb the 
expansive interpretations of the COJ and provide a limited appeals procedure,107 a defeat that 
further underscored the realities of the constitutional framework. Pointing to future reactions, a 
Private Member’s Bill introduced in the House of Commons but defeated at second reading 
would have allowed the House to ‘disapply’ specific COJ judgments where Parliament 
decided they were not in the national interest.108   
 
From our limited perspective, a warning bell had been rung when the COJ ruled in Johnston v 
Royal Ulster Constabulary109 that a ministerial certificate - effectively an ouster - could not 
under EC law bar review for legality by an employment tribunal. The reasoning was significant: 
first, the procedure inhibited the effectiveness of an EC Directive; secondly, access to judicial 
process was a ‘general principle of law’ reflecting the common constitutional traditions of the 
Member States and recognised by ECHR Articles 6(1) and 13. This left ouster clauses in an 
ambiguous position; we inferred in Pressure Through Law that they might be precluded by both 
EC law and the ECHR.110 There is equal uncertainty over retrospectivity, an issue that arose in a 
set of cases concerning changes to the law of unjust enrichment based on EC law.111 To deal 
with the problem, the Government enacted legislation that curtailed the limitation period for 
certain tax claims. Unsure about the validity of this retrospective element, the Supreme Court 
asked the COJ whether it was ‘compatible with the principles of effectiveness, legal certainty 
and legitimate expectations’ to bar claims in this manner ‘without notice and 
retrospectively’? The reply from the Court of Justice was conditional: retroactive change to the 
limitation period was permissible provided that adequate transitional arrangements were made; 
otherwise national legislation retroactively curtailing the period within which repayment 
could be claimed ‘infringes the principles of legal certainty and the protection of legitimate 
expectations’.112 This left the wider question open. 
 
Whether government reaction to the Court of Justice decision in Digital Rights Ireland 113 was 
a case of striking back is largely a matter of opinion. The Court had invalidated the EC Data 
Retention Directive, which imposed on electronic communications businesses an obligation to 
retain and make available certain data for purposes of ‘investigation, detection and prosecution 
of serious crime and terrorism’. In the UK, where the Directive had been implemented by codes 
                                                 
107 See A Partnership of Nations: The British Approach to the European Union Intergovernmental Conference 
1996, Cm 3181 (1996); J. Tallberg, ‘Supranational influence in EU enforcement: the COJ and the principle of 
state liability’ (2000) 7 JEPP 104, 114-5. 
108 HC Deb, vol 276, col 198 (23 April 1996) (Iain Duncan Smith MP). 
109 Case 222/84 Johnston v Royal Ulster Constabulary [1986] ECR 1651 at [13]. 
110 PtL at 318. 
111 Woolwich Equitable Building Society v IRC [1993] AC 70; Kleinwort Benson v Lincoln City Council [1999] 
2AC 349; Deutsche Morgan Grenfell Group plc v IRC [2006] 3 WLR 781. The foundational case was Case 
199/82 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v San Giorgio [1983] ECR 3595; Case C-446/04 Test 
Claimants in the F11 Group Litigation v IRC [2006] ECR I-11753. 
112 Case C-362/12 Test Claimants in the F11 Group Litigation v IRC (judgment of 12 December 2013) at [44-
49]. 
113 Joined Cases C-293/12, C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland and Seitlinger and Others (judgement of 8 April 
2014); Directive 2006/24/EC, OJ L 105/54 (13.4.2006). 
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of practice reinforced by Order in Council in terms of the European Communities Act,114 the 
legal situation was unclear; the Order was based on an invalid directive, which could hardly 
create an ‘EU obligation’ for the purposes of section 2(2). Purportedly to give effect to the three-
month old judgment, the Government suddenly announced the Data Retention and 
Investigatory Powers Bill, emergency legislation to be ‘fast tracked’ through Parliament in four 
days.  
 
Introducing the Bill, the Home Secretary expressed confidence that the Regulations remained in 
force but emphasised the need ‘to act now to remove any doubt about their legal basis and 
give effect to the COJ judgment’.115 Similarly, the Minister of State asserted that the 
regulations remained ‘extant and in full force and effect’ but because they had been 
questioned, it was essential ‘to deal with the risk and put the matter beyond doubt’.116 More 
robustly, the Chairman of the EU Scrutiny Committee said: 
 
The only way in which we can avoid running into difficulties with European Court 
judgments that we do not want—which, clearly, is what the Bill is about—is by using 
primary legislation, such as this Bill, to disapply the provisions of European law that 
come through sections 2 and 3 of the European Communities Act, and that it has to be 
notwithstanding those provisions.117 
 
Yet the use of fast track procedure points to ulterior motives. It was suggested, for example, 
that DRIPA was ‘far more than an administrative necessity; it [was] a serious expansion of 
the British surveillance state’ requiring ‘full and proper parliamentary scrutiny’.118 Equally, 
the aim may have been a wish to ‘clamp down’ on a pending judicial review application that 
challenged the 2009 Regulations in terms of EU law.119 If so, this was simply to postpone the 
evil. Liberty, acting in the names of two MPs, set down a judicial review application 
questioning the compatibility of DRIPA with Articles 7 and 8 of the EU Charter of 
Fundamental Rights and with Digital Rights Ireland.120 
 
Without referring to Luxembourg, the High Court interpreted Digital Rights Ireland 
generously to mean that legislation (such as DRIPA) that establishes a general retention 
regime for communications data must include an access regime (laid down at national level), 
which provides adequate safeguards for those rights. Applying this principle to DRIPA, the 
                                                 
114 Retention of Communications (Code of Practice) Order 2003, SI No. 2003/3175; Data Retention (EC 
Directive) Regulations 2007, SI No. 2007/2199, superseded by the Data Retention (EC Directive) Regulations 
2009, SI No. 2009/859. 
115 HC Deb vol 584, col 456 (10 July 2014) (Theresa May). The Bill is now the Data Retention and 
Investigatory Powers Act 2014. And see for later amendment by further fast track legislation, the  Counter-
Terrorism and Security Bill 2014 and JCHR, Legislative Scutiny: the  Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill, HC 
859 (2014/15) at [5.4] to [5.6].  
116 HC Deb, vol 584, col 763 (15 July 2014) (James Brokenshire).  
117 HC Deb, vol 584, col 765 (15 July 2014) (Sir William Cash MP). 
118 Open letter from fifteen technology-law academics, The Guardian, 15 July 2014. 
119 Cosgrove v Secretary of State for the Home Department CO/7701/2011 had been stayed pending the judgment 
of the Court of Justice. 
120 R (Davis and ors) v Home Secretary [2015] EWHC 2092 (Admin). As a fall back argument, the applicants 
pleaded their right of privacy under Article. 8 ECHR but the Court virtually ignored the point.  
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Court granted a declaration that it infringed EU legal requirements because it neither laid 
down clear and precise rules providing for access to and use of retained communications data 
nor did it provide for prior review by a court or independent administrative body to set the 
conditions of the access.121 Returning the ball hard to the baseline, the Court made an order 
disapplying s.1 of DRIPA in respect of the inconsistencies,  while suspending it for eight 
months to allow the Government to pass new legislation.122 It added the rider:  
 
The courts do not presume to tell Parliament for how long and in what detail Bills should 
be scrutinised, but it is right to say (to put it no higher) that legislation enacted in haste is 
more prone to error, and it would be highly desirable to allow the opportunity of thorough 
scrutiny in both Houses.123 
 
Other less final ways to strike back effectively at the European Courts exist through appeals, 
judicial delays and the jurisdictional complexities (Braibant’s category (i)) that afford 
multiple opportunities for manoeuvre in transnational jurisdictions. Delay has become an 
endemic problem in both European Courts: the epic Factortame saga, for example, took more 
than a decade to resolve while the backlog of cases awaiting decision by the ECtHR is 
notorious.124 The convoluted nature of EU decision-making procedures also lends itself to 
relentless ‘cat-and-mouse’ games played by governments at the expense of individuals. 
When, for example, the Iranian Organisation des Modjahedines (OMPI) was proscribed as a 
terrorist organisation in the UK and its assets frozen in 2001, it appealed successfully to the 
appropriate security tribunal (POAC). When this decision was upheld by the Court of Appeal 
in May 2008125 the Home Secretary duly made a delisting order, approved by Parliament in 
June. But OMPI was immediately re-listed by the Council of Ministers,126 necessitating 
renewed applications to the EU courts and it took six judicial hearings over ten years to get 
OMPI delisted in the EU.127 Again, after the assets of Sheikh Kadi were frozen in late 2001, 
the freeze was annulled by the General Court in 2010128 and the appeal against the decision 
was finally heard in 2013- in all, twelve costly and fruitless years of litigation.129 
 
Bringing rights home 
 
                                                 
121 Davis at [89-90]. 
122 Davis at [121-2]. s. 8 of DRIPA contained a ‘sunset clause’ providing for the operative provisions to expire 
at the end of 2016. In the meantime the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation had considered the 
legality of DRIPA and recommended amending legislation: see David Anderson Q.C., Question Of Trust Report 
Of The Investigatory Powers Review (June, 2015), Ch.5 
123 Davis at [122]. 
124 In 2013, a direct action in the CoJ averaged 20 months and, more significantly, a reference for a preliminary 
ruling added 15 months on average to the duration of proceedings in a national court: Court of Justice, Annual 
Report for 2014 at 9. Efforts to reduce the backlog led to the Council of Europe High Level Conference on the 
Future of the European Court of Human Rights and the ‘Brighton Declaration’ adopted in April 2012. . 
125 POAC Appeal No PC/02/2006; Home Secretary v Lord Alton of Liverpool [2008] EWCA Civ 443. 
126 Council Decision 2008/583/EC of 15 July 2008. 
127 The last being Case C-27/09P French Republic v People’s Mojahedin Organization of Iran [2011] ECR I-
13427. In the meantime, Sheikh Kadi had been delisted at the recommendation of the UN Ombudsperson.  
128 Case T-85/09 Yassin Abdullah Kadi v Commission [2010] ECR II-5177. 
129 Joined Cases C-584/10, C-593/10, C-595/10, Council, Commission and United Kingdom v Kadi [2013] ECR 
I-518. Kadi was in fact delisted at UN level prior to this hearing after the intervention of the UN ombudsperson. 
  
19 
 
The impact of the ECHR and its Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) was gradual. The ECHR 
was never legally enforceable within the UK and the domestic courts held back from judicial 
incorporation of what successive governments chose not to incorporate.130  Although the UK 
had also ratified ECHR Article 46, under which it is obliged to comply with any judgment of 
the Court in any case to which it is party, ECtHR judgements are not technically binding in 
the UK, and the only external control over implementation is through the highly political 
Committee of Ministers, whose resolutions –as we shall see - lack legal force. Nonetheless, 
in Pressure Through Law, we recorded a steady drip of public interest litigation by pressure 
groups based on the Convention and looked in detail at the 38 UK violations found by the 
ECtHR to 1989.131 Our conclusion was that implementation by the UK Government was 
usually forthcoming but not always in a whole-hearted fashion. There was the notorious ‘Asian 
wives case’, involving the right of immigrant Asian women to bring their husbands into the 
country. When the ECtHR found a discriminatory violation of the Article 8 right to family life, 
the Conservative Government ‘levelled down’ by administrative instruction, reducing men’s 
rights to bring in their wives, a response that the Joint Council for the Welfare of Immigrants, 
which had sponsored the case, called ‘negative, grudging, cynical and opportunist’.132 Again, 
after Campbell and Cosans,133 a key victory in the ECtHR for the campaign to stop corporal 
punishment in schools, the UK took only minimum steps to implement the decision by 
administrative direction, applying it to Scottish but not English or Welsh schools and then only 
if parents actively refused consent to corporal punishment.  
 
The changes introduced by the Human Rights Act 1998 were substantial and are the subject 
of a rich though often legalistic literature. All that is necessary for our purposes is to know 
that, in stark contrast to the COJ, ECtHR jurisprudence does not bind the domestic courts. 
Section 2(1) of the HRA requires the UK courts simply to ‘take account’ of decisions of the 
ECtHR insofar as they are relevant; section 3 requires the courts ‘so far as possible’ to 
interpret and apply domestic legislation in a manner compatible with the Convention rights  
and, where this is impossible, section 4 enables the court to make a declaration of 
incompatibility, the effect of which is not to invalidate the statutory provision but to invite 
Parliament to reconsider the issue. In this way, the principle of parliamentary sovereignty is 
said to be preserved.  
 
Responsibility for ensuring compatibility of statute law with human rights law is actually 
shared: section 10 of the HRA allows a minister where necessary to amend statute by means 
of statutory instrument but Schedule 2 subjects such orders to affirmative resolution of both 
Houses. Section19 obliges a minister when introducing a bill into Parliament to make a 
declaration as to its compatibility with the ECHR or, if unable to do so, to explain why action 
is necessary, leaving the final decision to Parliament and its committees. Implementation of 
ECtHR judgments is a government responsibility but is systematically monitored by the Joint 
                                                 
130 R v Home Secretary ex p Brind [1991] 1 AC 696. And see Sir Thomas Bingham, 'The European ECHR on 
Human Rights, Time to Incorporate' (1993) 109 LQR 390. 
131 PtL at 254-5. By 1989, 52 complaints against the UK had reached the ECtHR. 
132 Abdulaziz, Cabales and Balkandali v UK (1985) 7 EHRR 471; JCWI, AR 1984/5 at 3. 
133 Campbell and Cosans v United Kingdom (1982) 4 EHRR 293; PtL at 262-3. 
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Committee on Human Rights, which is often highly critical. From the standpoint of the 
domestic courts, the effect of the HRA was to shift responsibility to them for ‘form[ing] a 
judgment whether a ECHR right has been breached and, so far as permissible under the Act, 
grant[ing] an effective remedy’134 thus making them a potential target for striking back. This 
may help to explain the adoption of the so-called ‘mirror principle’ enunciated by Lord 
Bingham in Ullah,135 which transferred responsibility to the ECtHR by providing that the 
domestic courts would go as far as but no farther than Strasbourg in interpreting the ECHR. It 
may also help to explain why, as hostility to Strasbourg has grown, the domestic courts are 
keen to increase their room for manoeuvre and are cautiously beginning to draw back.136  
 
 
A rising crescendo 
 
In Pressure Through Law we noted the start of long-lasting struggles with Strasbourg over 
prisoners’ rights. Golder v UK,137 which concerned the right of prisoners to correspond with a 
lawyer, saw the start of problems with Articles 6(1) and 8, while the conformity of procedures in 
mandatory life and indeterminate sentences with ECHR Article 5 was initiated by Weeks v 
United Kingdom.138 Prisoners’ rights cases were defended with spirit; along the way 
indefensible cases were fought and predictably lost in Strasbourg and were implemented 
according to the letter and not the spirit of the rulings. The flames of resentment were stoked 
by Hirst,139 where the Grand Chamber held that the automatic disenfranchisement of 
prisoners at parliamentary or local government elections as mandated by section3 of the 
Representation of the People Act 1983 was disproportionate and violated ECHR Protocol 1, 
Article 3. The margin of appreciation accorded to states under the ECHR was wide but not 
all-embracing and this ‘blanket restriction’ fell outside any acceptable margin of 
appreciation, ‘however wide that margin might be’.140 The majority judgment took 
Westminster on directly, remarking that there was no evidence that Parliament had, since 
1968, ‘ever sought to weigh the competing interests or to assess the proportionality of a 
blanket ban on the right of a convicted prisoner to vote’. 141  
 
The House of Commons struck back with a Westminster Hall debate set down by a 
Euroseceptic backbencher, who called for a ‘proper parliamentary debate on the issue, so that 
colleagues can debate the pros and cons and be given the opportunity to vote to maintain the 
                                                 
134 R(Daly) v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2001] UKHL 26  at [23] (Lord Bingham). 
135 R (Ullah) v Special Adjudicator [2004] 2AC 976 at [20] (Lord Bingham).. 
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137 (1975) 1 EHRR 524. 
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status quo’; the Hirst affair was ‘a golden opportunity’ for the then Coalition Government ‘to 
put Britain first’ and consider ‘pulling out of the Convention’.142 There was no government 
response. A more moderate, cross-party, backbench motion followed asserting that 
‘legislative decisions of this nature should be a matter for democratically-elected lawmakers’ 
and supporting ‘the current situation in which no prisoner is able to vote except those 
imprisoned for contempt, default or on remand’. It passed by 234 to 22 votes.143  
 
Initially, the ECtHR had asked for legislation within six months. The previous Labour 
Government had made gestures at compliance with a two-stage consultation on policy 
options, which remained unimplemented at the time of the UK General Election in 2010. Left 
to clear up the mess, the Coalition announced legislation which would provide for offenders 
sentenced to a custodial sentence of less than four years to vote in UK Westminster 
Parliamentary and European Parliament elections, unless the judge considered this 
inappropriate when making the sentence.144 In the same year, the Court, treating Greens and 
MT as a ‘pilot case’ imposed a further six-month deadline.145 By 2013, when no timetable had 
been announced for legislation, the Government intervened in the Scoppola case146 to ask the 
ECtHR to reconsider Hirst. The Court firmly declined. Caught between the ECtHR and 
Parliament, the Supreme Court manoeuvred skilfully in Chester, holding itself bound to 
follow the law as repeatedly confirmed by Strasbourg but declining to grant a further 
declaration of invalidity.147 Perhaps thankfully, Lord Mance declared that it was ‘now for 
Parliament as the democratically elected legislature to complete its consideration of the 
position’.148 
 
In fact, the Ministry of Justice had in November 2012 submitted to a Committee of both 
Houses a draft bill with three options: a ban on prisoners sentenced to four or more years; a 
ban on prisoners sentenced to six months or more; a restatement of the existing ban. The 
Committee recommended that prisoners serving sentences of 12 months or less should have 
the vote.149 No mention was made of the Bill in the government legislative programme for 
2014 or indeed in the 2015 legislative programme of the newly elected Conservative 
Government and no legislation has been forthcoming.  
 
If prisoners' voting is – as Lady Hale remarked in Chester- an emotive subject on which 
people seem to hold strong views then immigration is a high-visibility political issue on 
which the outcome of elections may turn. As the ECtHR began to interpret the ECHR as a 
‘living instrument’, to expand its ambit by opening up the area of security that government 
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tends to regard as peculiarly its own territory, and extend its protection to immigrants, 
hostility to the Strasbourg Court began to grow. Less than ten years after the HRA had been 
adopted, Tony Blair had called for possible amendments to the HRA to compel judges to 
balance the rights of the individual with public safety, which they ‘do not always do’; David 
Cameron, then in Opposition, was promising to ‘reform or repeal’ the Act.150 Events came to 
a head in the case of Abu Qatada, a radical Muslim cleric. Lawfully in the country as a 
refugee, Abu Qatada was arrested in October 2002, detained under the governing ant-
terrorism legislation and served with notice of intention to deport while his appeal against his 
control order was still pending. It took nearly a decade of litigation before Abu Qatada was 
finally deported,151 fuelling resentment at the Strasbourg case law, which limited the power 
to deport or extradite suspected terrorists if they were likely to be tortured. It is, however, 
noteworthy that the Government made no attempt to strike back.  
 
Tensions have undoubtedly been rising with the target of animosity shifting to the use – or 
misuse according to one’s viewpoint - of ECHR Article 8 to protect convicted criminals 
against deportation for family reasons, an area now attracting a multiplicity of immigration 
appeals. Until recently, the question whether deportation was in the public interest was very 
much a matter of discretion, in the first instance for the Home Secretary who made the 
deportation order, afterwards for the courts who reviewed the decision. The factors to be 
taken into consideration were later incorporated into non-statutory Immigration Rules, which 
were laid before Parliament.152 It was the effect of the ‘mirror principle’ that changed the 
rules of the game by substituting for  the ministerial view of the public interest a two-stage 
test to be applied by the courts with reference to the Strasbourg jurisprudence and the 
proportionality principle that this enjoined.153 By 2010, the impact on deportation of 
suspected terrorists and convicted criminals was so considerable154 as to persuade the Home 
Secretary, Theresa May, into announcing changes to the rules ‘to ensure that the 
misinterpretation of Article Eight of the ECHR – the right to a family life – no longer 
prevents the deportation of people who shouldn’t be here’.155 It now fell to the courts to 
consider whether the ‘new Rules’ created a ‘complete code’ as the Government argued, 
rolling up Article 8 proportionality testing into a single determination conducted in the 
framework of the Rules. Both the Upper Tribunal and Court of Appeal disagreed. The 
primary decision-makers were as much bound by section 6 of the Human Rights Act as the 
judges and the new rules ‘maintain[ed] the obligation on primary decision-makers to act "in 
compliance with" all the provisions of the Convention’.156 
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Up to this point, the Government had stopped short at attempting draconian measures such as 
ouster, thought likely to violate the ECHR or international law. Now it struck back with 
legislation that hit at Article 8 adjudication in two slightly different ways. First, it allowed the 
Secretary of State to prevent a person bringing an appeal from the UK when the Secretary of 
State certified that removal would be in the interests of national security – a technique 
redolent of that outlawed by the CoJ in Johnston.157 Secondly, it gave the force of primary 
legislation to the Rules by ‘requiring a court or tribunal, when determining whether a 
decision is in breach of Article 8 ECHR, to have regard to the public interest considerations 
as set out in the Act’.158 The Act specifies in very considerable detail the criteria to be applied 
by judges when determining the public interest and the weight that should be given to them. 
This provision, which sought to guide courts and tribunals in their determination of Article 8 
claims in immigration cases, was drawn to the attention of the House of Lords by its 
Constitution Committee, which called it ‘a significant innovation’.159 The JCHR concern was 
greater; it saw the provision as a significant legislative trespass into the judicial function160 
and recommended amendment, which was not conceded. The tenor of some of the speeches 
in the legislative debates hinted at a changing climate of opinion. Critics targeted both the 
Strasbourg Court for ‘steadily eroding’ UK powers of deportation and the UK courts, 
responsible for tightening the fetters as a consequence ‘rightly or wrongly’ of the Human 
Rights Act. Parliament, it was argued, must ‘make it clear which, ultimately, is the supreme 
court for British law’; ‘the final word should stay in this country’.161 
 
In the different policy area of benefits entitlement, Reilly and Wilson162 bit more deeply into 
political autonomy. The case concerned a package of welfare reforms supposedly designed to 
assist the unemployed in finding employment. As an element in this package, certain 
jobseekers were required to participate when instructed to do so in a specified, work-related 
scheme; further, a claimant who refused unreasonably to do so could be sanctioned by loss of 
benefit. In Reilly and Wilson, the package was challenged on the ground that the Regulations 
made under the Act163 were insufficiently specific; that the general notice required by the 
statute was inadequate and that, in the case of one of the claimants, no notification had been 
given. The Court of Appeal ruled the Regulations ultra vires; they did not contain an 
appropriate description of the scheme and the notices sent to claimants did not comply with 
the statutory requirements.164 The Government struck back immediately, using the package 
tried and tested in social security cases as described in Part I. The 2011 Regulations were 
revoked and replaced by new prospective Regulations, which came into effect on the date of 
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the Court of Appeal judgment.165 This was followed up with retrospective legislation. The 
Jobseekers (Back to Work Schemes) Bill introduced into the Commons on 14 March 2013 
under ‘fast-track procedure’,166 provided that notices served under the 2011 Regulations 
informing claimants about participation requirements and the consequences of failing to meet 
them, were effective. The Bill was in short designed to strike back at the Court of Appeal 
judgment and to provide against future appeals.  
 
The Bill did not escape parliamentary censure. There were two main accusations: there was 
an abuse of emergency procedures to fix the consequences of losing an appeal and the Bill 
was suspect on the grounds of retrospectivity. The government response to the Commons was 
unconvincing: the judgments had been ‘about a technicality’; the system was robust and 
would stand up to scrutiny by the courts, as the Government hoped to show by continuing an 
appeal before the Supreme Court; emergency legislation was the only way to insure against 
substantial sums in sanction repayments if the appeal were to succeed.167 The House of Lords 
Constitution Committee took both points; in particular, the Bill offended:   
 
the cardinal rule of law principle that individuals may be punished or penalised only 
for contravening what was at the time a valid legal requirement. According to the 
doctrine of the sovereignty of Parliament, retrospective legislation is lawful. 
Nonetheless, from a constitutional point of view it should wherever possible be 
avoided, since the law should so far as possible be clear, accessible and predictable.168  
Unusually, despite the fact that their judgment would be hypothetical, the Supreme Court 
chose to press on. It was, they explained, ‘rather unattractive for the executive to be taking up 
court time and public money to establish that a regulation is valid, when it has already taken 
up Parliamentary time to enact legislation which retrospectively validates the regulation’; 
nonetheless the issue could be of some significance to the drafting of regulations generally.169 
It confirmed the Court of Appeal reasoning while allowing the appeal by reason of the 2013 
Act.  
But the HRA had provided the claimants with further arguments. In Reilly and Hewstone,170 
aggrieved claimants returned to the High Court to challenge the 2013 Act on the ground that 
the claimants’ right to a fair trial under ECHR Article 6(1) had been violated. This brought 
the Strasbourg jurisprudence squarely into the frame. The Convention argument was that 
retrospective legislation when used to affect the outcome of a judicial determination where 
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the state itself was a party was justifiable only on ‘compelling grounds of the public interest’. 
Perhaps surprisingly, the judge granted a declaration of invalidity that the 2013 Act was 
incompatible with the principle of the rule of law and the notion of a fair trial protected by 
ECHR Article 6(1). This ruling reworks the constitutional position. As correctly stated by the 
Constitution Committee, retrospective legislation is lawful subject to an understanding in the 
nature of convention that it is highly undesirable; Reilly and Hewstone elevates this to a 
serious legal obstacle to the practice. Moreover the judge carried the war on to parliamentary 
territory, raking through the parliamentary proceedings with a nit-comb, discovering a 
number of ‘misconceptions’ and ‘inaccuracies’.171 This type of approach strengthens the 
argument for ‘notwithstanding’ clauses and heightens the danger that government may strike 
back with a more general attack on the Human Rights Act.  
 
Conclusion 
 
Our objective in this paper has been to examine negative responses from government to 
unfavourable judicial decisions and the techniques available for striking back at the judiciary 
and clamping down on judicial review. We have considered two classes of case; 
retrospective, where government expunges the effects of a particular decision, and 
prospective, where it seeks to prevent or inhibit unwanted challenges or decisions, often by 
changing the rules of the game. We have looked at these practices in two different 
constitutional contexts: first, in the framework of the classical British constitution, where 
Parliament is sovereign and secondly in the more restrictive framework of the post-European 
constitution. And, with a wish to avoid the court-centred literature that is a particular feature 
of the law and democracy debate, we have deliberately side-stepped the question of judicial 
techniques used to respond in kind. This paper is, as we remarked in our Introduction, a 
modest attempt to redress the balance.  
 
We have in fact uncovered a considerable degree of continuity. Part I of the paper dealt with 
striking back in the domestic context; in other words, in a modified framework of 
Westminster government predicated on the day-to-day working of parliamentary sovereignty. 
Here we saw in the context of social security law a regular practice of retrospective 
legislation coupled with pre-emptive strikes. It was somewhat surprising to find identical 
techniques used in the Jobseekers’ affair, nearly fifteen years after the HRA became law. In 
both cases, the legitimacy of this type of activity is in issue and, although we have chosen not 
to dwell at length on these questions, we have quoted instances where there is a clear 
violation of the rule of law. In our view, retrospective legislation striking down an unpopular 
decision in the course of the appeal process is - though emphatically not illegal -  a dubious 
practice, especially when it is carried out by regulations or ‘fast track’ procedure that escape 
proper debate in Parliament. We support in this context Prosser’s suggestion that retrospective 
legislation should, if it is to be legitimate, measure up to the three basic good governance 
principles of openness, participation and accountability, which requires that government must 
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publicly present a properly reasoned justification for its actions and provide the opportunity for 
adequate informed debate. 
 
It is generally supposed that the UK's latter-day relationships with Europe and more particularly 
the establishment of powerful transnational courts in Strasbourg and Luxembourg have brought 
about a fundamental shift in power away from Parliament and the doctrine of parliamentary 
sovereignty as propounded by Dicey. Our case studies in Part II suggest that this is not entirely 
true. Yes, limitations have in principle been imposed on government action and we may think 
that the restrictions are likely to tighten. Yet, as indicated earlier, we have registered a 
considerable degree of consistency. All the main techniques for striking back, whether directly 
through ouster, validatory legislation, delaying tactics or the retaking of annulled decisions by 
proper procedures, are still in play. Recently too, there has been resort to indirect measures such 
as changing the rules of judicial review procedure and upping its cost so as to undercut the 
judicial review process and clamp-down on targeted litigants. In short traditional techniques 
are still in use, though their weight and value may have changed. Perhaps more importantly, 
there is little evidence of a decisive change in the mindset of successive governments. At the 
time of writing indeed a Conservative Government is in power with a manifesto commitment 
to support a general strike-back at judicial power through replacement of the HRA and 
perhaps, in the event of a No vote in the promised referendum, to engineer a ‘Brexit’ from the 
EU. But these ‘nuclear options’ raise questions better left for discussion in the context of a 
full-scale law and democracy debate that we prefer to reserve for another occasion. 
 
 
